The nexus of real exchange rate (RER) and capital inflows is examined through a comparative analysis of the experiences of emerging market economies in Asian and Latin America during the period 1985-2000. It is found that the degree of appreciation in RER associated with capital inflow is uniformly much higher in Latin American countries compared to their Asian counterparts, despite the fact that the latter experienced far greater foreign capital inflows relative to the size of the economy. The econometric evidence suggests that both the composition of capital flows and differences in the degree of response of RER to capital flows matter in explaining these contrasting experiences. While RER appreciation is a phenomenon predominantly associated with other (non-FDI) forms of capital inflows (OCFW), a given level of OCFW brings about a far greater degree of appreciation of the real exchange rate in Latin America where the importance of these flows in total capital inflow is also far greater. On the policy front, Asian countries seem to have used fiscal contraction and nominal exchange rate adjustment more effectively to cushion the RER against the appreciation pressure of capital inflows. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that sterilized intervention can generate a lasting impact on the real exchange rate. bring about an appreciation of the real exchange rate (the relative price of traded to nontraded goods) with adverse affects on traded-goods production in the domestic economy.
INTRODUCTION
The string of financial crises in emerging-market economies in the 1990s and the global reverberations that followed them have added new impetus to the debate on how to reconcile international capital mobility with domestic economic stability and developmental priorities in investment receiving developing countries. The unqualified enthusiasm for promoting capital flows to aid economic advancement in these countries has given way to a new emphasis on finding ways and means of ameliorating unfavorable side effects of 'too much' capital inflow. At the center of this debate is what Corden (1994, p. 8) calls the 'real exchange rate problem'the possibility that capital inflows bring about an appreciation of the real exchange rate (the relative price of traded to nontraded goods) with adverse affects on traded-goods production in the domestic economy.
If a country relies on foreign capital (or any other inward transfer) to maintain high levels of domestic absorption, it is natural for the real exchange rate to appreciate, regardless of the exchange rate regime. The increased spending on traded goods will be accommodated through an increase in the trade deficit with no adverse impact on the real exchange rate. By contrast the excess demand on non-traded goods will result in an increase in the price of these goods relative to that of traded goods. This price adjustment occurs either through an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate under a floating exchange rate system or through an increase in nominal prices of non-traded goods in a fixed exchange rate regime, or through a mixture of the two processes in an intermediate (fixed-but-adjustable) regime. But the problem with this natural (equilibrium) phenomenon is that capital inflows may well be temporary, and hence in due course real depreciation is likely, which may require a painful and politically unpalatable economic adjustment. At the same time, capital inflow-induced real appreciation can have adverse impact on economic adjustment during the boom period, hampering the country's ability to face such an eventuality. It tends to discourage traded-good sectors, divert resources to over-consumption or investment in low yielding non-tradable goods sectors. Moreover persistent real appreciation could well set the stage for a speculative attack on the national currency, putting an end to the very economic boom fueled by capital inflows.
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There is a sizable literature on the patterns and determinants of capital flows to Asia and Latin America and problems of macroeconomic management in the context of increased capital mobility.
2 However to our knowledge there has not been any systematic comparative analysis of the nexus of real exchange rate and capital flows encompassing countries in the two regions. The general perception in the literature is that the East Asian countries have done fairly well in absorbing capital inflows without a seriously damaging impact on economic performance operating though real exchange rate appreciation. However, there is a number of important issues yet to be answered relating to the comparative performance of these countries to inform the on-going debate.
Can the observed greater susceptibility of the real exchange rate in Latin American countries to capital inflows be explained in terms of differences in policy responses alone? If so what are these policies? Are there some region-specific factors (rooted in the macroeconomic policy history, for example), which make Latin American countries more vulnerable to real appreciation associated with a given level of capital inflow? Does the 1 In the recent literature on currency crises, persistent appreciation of the real exchange rate (adjusted for fundamentals) has been identified as a major factor in setting the scene for a crisis. This is because a persistent real appreciation implies that economic fundamentals of the country may not permit the authorities to defend the currency successfully in the event of a speculative attack. (Kaminsky et al. 1997, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1995) .
composition of capital inflows matter? In particular, is foreign direct investment different from other capital inflows in its impact on the real exchange rate?
This paper aims to examine these and related issues through a comparative analysis of the experiences of eight Asian economics (China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) during the period 1985-2000. 3 The choice of the sample was primarily dictated by data availability, but it contains all major countries in the two regions which were exposed to significant international capital flows in the 1990s. There are notable differences among these countries in terms of the 'official' (de jure) exchange rate regime adapted during the study period, ranging from a fixed rate (currency board) regime in Argentina to a 'freely floating' regimes in the Philippines. But the available evidence on the actual exchange rate practices of these countries (Corden 2002 , Edwards 2000 , Williamson and Mahar 1998 amply supports the view that during most of the period under study all countries de facto maintained fixed (but adjustable) exchange regimes, with the United States dollar as the key intervention currency. Thus, our country sample provides a near laboratory setting for studying issues involved in maintaining a fixed exchange rate commitment while averting real exchange rate appreciation in face of high capital inflows.
We could not think of a better subject for a paper in honor of Max Corden.
During the past four decades of his illustrious career he has made a notable contribution to broadening our knowledge of the real exchange problem both through policy-oriented work and, more importantly, through analytical research. Relating to the latter, starting with his seminal 1960 paper, he has played a key role in developing and popularizing the dependent economy model (recently renamed as 'Salter-Swan-Corden-Dornbusch model'
by Fisher 1995, p. 2863) which is the workhorse of policy-oriented research in the sphere of macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries.
3 The original research plan for this paper aimed to cover a longer time period, from 1975-2000 with a view to undertaking a comparative analysis of the capital inflow boom in the 1990s and with the previous boom during 1978-82. It was subsequently realized that the two episodes cannot be meaningfully analyzed with a unified framework because the previous episode was markedly different from the latter episode in terms of the international environment, type of flows, economic structures of the recipient countries and policy responses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a comparative overview of trends and patterns of capital inflows to the two regions. Section 3 takes a first look at the relationship between capital flows and the real exchange rate through an examination of time-series plots. Section 4 undertakes an in-depth empirical analysis of the role of capital flows among other variables impacting on the real exchange rate behavior, with emphasis on similarities and differences between countries in the two regions. This section proceeds in two steps. First, a single-equation model is formulated and estimated to delineate the impact of capital inflows on the real exchange rate while controlling for other relevant variables suggested by the theory. Second, the econometric estimates are combined with data on the key variables for individual countries to make inferences about the observed differences between the two regions. The key inferences are summarized in the final section.
TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF CAPITAL INFLOW
The post-Second-World-War era has witnessed two major episodes of capital inflow surges to developing countries. The first was associated with the petrodollar recycling 
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Reflecting the global reverberation of the Asian crisis (which was subsequently amplified by the Russian and Brazilian crises) total flows to Latin America declined from US$68 4 Relative importance of the pull and push factors has been extensively debated in the literature. See for instance Corbo and Hernandez 2000 and the works referred to therein.
5 Data on total capital flows (public + private) covering the entire period and with required disaggreation are not readily available. But private capital flows depicted in Figure 1 provide an accurate picture of the trends in total capital flows because net public flows dwindled from about the late-1980s reaching less than US$ 10 billion (less than 5% of total annual flows) by the mid-1990s. 6 In the five crisis-affected countries in Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines) the turnaround in capital flows during 1996-97 amounted to US$105 billions, more than 10% of the combined GDP of these combined economies. The Asian countries as a group received relatively higher share of inflows in the form of FDI. However there were considerable differences in the FDI share among the countries in the region. For instance South Korea was a net overseas foreign direct investor throughout and total net inflows to that country predominantly took the form of portfolio capital and bank borrowing. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia also relied on bank borrowing to a significant extent, although FDI share in total flows to these countries remained much larger compared to their Latin American counterparts.
FDI accounted for the overwhelming share of net flows to China and Malaysia. FDI flows to Latin American countries (other than Chile) were basically related to privatization of state-owned enterprises, whereas in Asia, particularly in East Asia, such flows were in the form of green-field investment. There is also evidence that a relatively higher share of FDI inflows to Latin America had gone to non-traded sectors (construction and commercial services) and natural resource development, compared to Asia. In Asia FDI was by and large in traded-good sectors, mostly in export-oriented manufacturing (Ito 2000 , Reisen 2000 . 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE-CAPITAL FLOW NEXUS: A FIRST LOOK
This section looks at the capital flows-real exchange nexus as a prelude to the econometric analysis in the next section. The real exchange rate (RER) is measured here as the ratio of export-weighted wholesale price index of trading partner countries expressed in domestic currency relative to the domestic GDP deflator. The rationale behind the choice of this particular measure among various proxy measures of RER is discussed in the Appendix. In Figure 2 , RER is plotted for each country together with net capital inflow measured as a percentage of GDP (denoted CFW). In each graph, the beginning and end of the capital inflow episode in the 1990s are demarcated with vertical lines. In Table 2 , the data are summarised for the capital inflows episodes in the 1990s.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Insert Table 2 
about here
The general observation that the degree of RER appreciation associated with capital inflow is uniformly much higher in Latin American countries compared to their Asian counterparts is clearly borne out by this comparison. Focusing on the capital inflow episodes (Figure 2 ), the real exchange rate appreciated by almost 43.5% in Argentina during its early-1990s capital inflow episode, compared to the three preceding years ( Table 2 ). The rates of appreciation for the other five countries ranged between 14.7% (Brazil) to 33.8% (Mexico). Among the Asian countries, only the Philippines experienced a rate of appreciation that comes closer to the average level for the Latin American countries. The degrees of appreciation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand and the Philippines were rather mild, ranging from 2.3% to 11.2%. In India and China, the real exchange continued to depreciate (rather than appreciate) during their inflow episode. In India, capital inflows occurred against the backdrop of a significant structural adjustment reform. Discretionary devaluation as part of this reform package seems to have offset the impact of capital inflows.
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In early 1994 China decisively reformed its exchange rate mechanism resulting in a real depreciation of the Yuan by 17% over the previous year, placing the country in a position of strength to withstand massive capital inflows in the subsequent years. The average degree of depreciation reported in Table 2 must therefore be viewed in the context of this successful, early exchange rate adjustment (Athukorala and Warr 2002, p. 50) .
REAL EXCHANGE RATE-CAPITAL FLOW NEXUS: EMPIRICAL ALYSIS
In the previous section we observed that, although there was considerable inter-country variations in the relationship between capital inflow and changes in the real exchange rate among the countries under study, the six Latin American countries experienced a uniformly higher degree of real exchange rate appreciation associated with capital inflows compared to Asian countries. In this section we proceed to probe these similarities and differences in two steps. First a single-equation model is developed and estimated using pooled time-series data for the fifteen countries to delineate the like between the real exchange rate and capital inflows while controlling for other factors.
Second parameter estimates of the model are combined with data on the key explanatory variables to explain inter-group and inter-country differences.
Our model aims to explain the behavior of RER in terms of capital inflows There are however strong reasons for hypothesizing that the degree of real exchange rate appreciation associated with a given level of FDI inflows tends be smaller in magnitude compared to other flows, in particular portfolio flows and bank lending (Ito 2000 , Resin 2000 , Lipsey 2000 . Compared to other flows, FDI in developing countries has a general 9 OCFW covers both private and public flows. Data are not available for most of the countries under study to treat them separately. 10 We do not intend to spell-out the dependent economy model here for want of space. The interested reader is referred to Corden 1994, Chapter 1, which contains perhaps the best, nontechnical exposition of the model. 11 Edwards and Savastano (2000) provide a comprehensive survey of various studies of real exchange rate determination (pp.488-90 and Table 13 .5).
tendency to concentrate more in traded goods sectors. Moreover with the on-going process of transformation in international production and rapid economic opening in investment receiving (host) countries there has been a significant increase of FDI participation in export-oriented production. This is particularly so in the East Asian countries in our country sample (Ito 2000) . Thus the pressure on non-traded goods prices resulting from FDI-related activities is presumably lower compared to that arising from the other forms of capital inflow. Moreover, FDI is also not as volatile as the other shortterm flows. Therefore any possible ratchet (lingering) effect on the real exchange rate resulting from upswings in inflows is likely to be less important in the case of FDI. For these reasons we treat FDI and other capital inflows as two separate variables in our analysis and assume the effect of the former to be smaller in magnitude compared to that of the latter.
The attractiveness of a given country for FDI depends crucially on the general investment climate, which primarily reflects the cumulative outcome of economic policy reforms (Calvo et al., 1996 , Feenstra 2000 , Corbo and Hernandez 2000 . However there is evidence that the composition of capital inflows can also be tilted in favor of FDI (and other long-term flows) through policies specifically aimed at discouraging shortterm flows. The most cited evidence of such policy engineered compositional shift comes from Chile and Colombia. 12 There is also evidence from China and Malaysia 13 that the government can intervene in short-term flows and still provide a hospitable environment for FDI (Corden 2002 , Stiglitz 2000 , Athukorala 2001 , Garnaut 1999 . The disaggregated treatment of capital flows in our analysis should help understand whether such policy-induced shift in the composition of capital inflows can help ameliorate the effect of total inflows on the real exchange rate.
12 See Larian 2000, pp. 11-12 and the work cited therein. Note that here we refer to composition shift, rather than the total volume, of capital inflows. Whether the Chilean and Colombian capital controls have had any dampening effect on the volume of inflow still remains a controversial issue (Edwards 2000) .
The options open to policy makers to cushion the real exchange rate against pressure of appreciation arising from capital inflows under a fixed exchange rate are of three types. These are fiscal contraction, sterilizing foreign exchange market interventions and nominal exchange rate adjustment. In our model each of these policy stances are represented respectively by government expenditure (relative to GDP) (GEXP), excess growth in money supply (M2) measured as the difference between growth in M2 and real GDP growth (EXMG) 14 , and change in the nominal exchange rate (DNER).
In the context of an investment boom funded by capital inflows, fiscal contraction can act as an effective stabilizer in moderating the real exchange rate effect of capital inflow boom. The absorption of capital inflows would increase demand for domestic goods and the fiscal contraction would reduce it. In addition to this general demand contraction effect, reduction in government expenditure can have a favorable switching effect because government expenditure tends to be spent more on non-tradables, unlike private consumption.
The measure widely used to represent a fiscal policy stance in this type of analyses is the budgetary balance (measured as a ratio of GDP). But we believe that government expenditure is a superior indicator because in the context of an economic boom a country could well experience a 'revenue surplus', a reflection of a faster revenue growth compared to expenditure growth. Meaningful deficit comparison across countries should correct for such biases. Another problem with published data on budget deficits is that different definitions of taxation and borrowing can heavily skew the measured deficit (Sachs 1985) .
When foreign capital flows into a country that has a fixed exchange rate commitment, the central bank is naturally forced to purchase excessive flows (that is build up its foreign exchange reserves) in order to maintain the 'desired' level of stability in the nominal exchange rate. However, the mere purchase of foreign currency (non- Sterilized intervention is a useful policy that can provide some short-term relief in the context of excessive capital inflow. But to the extent that sterilization drives shortterm interest rates higher, it may perpetrate excess capital inflows and real appreciation.
This is going to be a particularly binding constraint if FDI and other long-term inflows account for a large share of total inflows. In such a case, one-to-one sterilization will likely increase the short-term interest rate leading to an increase in short-term capital (Ito 2000) . Another important problem with sterilized intervention, particularly raised in the Latin American context, relates to the alleged fiscal cost; domestic market intervention of the Central Bank involves paying a higher interest rate than what is earned on accumulated foreign reserves, which are usually invested in low-yielding short-term securities (Calvo 1991) . When such costs build up authorities are naturally forced to backtrack from their policy commitment to support the currency. For these reasons, sterilized intervention is generally considered a far less effective policy instrument compared to fiscal contraction in averting the problem of real exchange rate appreciation in face of large capital inflows.
The third policy instrument considered here is nominal exchange rate adjustment.
Within the boundaries set by the particular exchange rate regime chosen, countries have the ability to take steps to correct from time to time the disequilibria in the fixed (but adjustable) nominal rate against the intervention currency (US$). Such exchange rate practice has been referred to in the literature as one of the contributory factors for the success of East Asian countries to maintain the real exchange rate at realistic levels (Garnaut 1999 , Krueger 1997 , Reisin 2000 
The dependent variable (RER) is the real exchange rate index (as defined in the Appendix). An increase (decrease) in RER indicates real depreciation (appreciation). The independent variables are given below (with the signs expected for the regression coefficients in parentheses):
15 Sachs and Warner (1995) employ the following criteria Sachs-Warner (1995) Table. 4.
Insert Table 3 about here
Insert Table 4 These estimates yield two important inferences. First, in both regions 'the real exchange rate problem' is a phenomenon specifically associated with 'other' capital flows (OCFW). Second, these flows have a greater dampening impact on the real exchange in
Latin America compared to that in Asia. At least part of the explanation for this difference may be rooted in differences in the macroeconomic policy histories of the two regions.
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For instance, given the proven track record of maintaining macroeconomic stability, it is likely that the pressure on non-tradable prices resulting from resources transfers to the Asian countries is counterbalanced by an increase in domestic saving and investment.
Why FDI inflows tend to depreciate (rather than appreciate) real exchange rate is an interesting issue which requires further investigation. However, we believe that this result is consistent with our hypothesis that FDI generally tends to have a more tradable bias compared to the other types of capital flows. The lower magnitude of the measured relationship for Latin America may reflect differences in the output composition of FDIrelated activities in the two regions; as noted in Section 2 there is evidence that FDIrelated activities in Latin America have a greater non-tradable bias.
The coefficient attached to GEXP is uniformly applicable to both regions as the coefficient on the slope dummy variable, LA*GEXP, is not statistically different from zero. It suggests that a one percent contraction in government expenditure to GDP ratio is associated with 3.17 per cent depreciate in the real exchange rate. Thus our results support the theoretical proposition that fiscal contraction is a powerful cushion for all countries against real exchange appreciation associated with capital inflows. This result for GEXP when combined with the data on this variable for individual countries (Table 4) provides a powerful explanation as to why the Asian countries experienced a rather mild appreciation in the real exchange rate compared to the experience of their Latin counterparts. In the former countries government expenditure has remained flat or even declined during the period of the boom. In Malaysia and Thailand government expenditure in relation to GDP declined in the wake of capital influx in the early 1990s.
In Latin America, all countries except Chile government expenditure increased, and
Brazil and Argentina recorded increases of more than four percentage points. The only Asian country to record an increase in government expenditure during the boom is the Philippines.
As already noted, the excess money growth variable (EXMS) failed to yield a statistically significant coefficient and the coefficient of the other variables were remarkably resilient to its inclusion in (or exclusion from) the model. This result is consistent with the widely held views about the impotence of sterilized intervention as a policy tool in averting real exchange rate appreciation in face of high capital inflows.
Finally, the results for DNER suggest, on average one percentage point depreciation in the nominal exchange rate change translates in to 0.5 per cent depreciation in the real exchange rate. However, the coefficient estimate for the related slope dummy variable (LA*DNER) suggests that the impact is rather small (0.05 per cent)
for the for Latin American countries. These results are consistent with the view that the Asian countries have been more successful in averting real exchange rate appreciation through nominal exchange rate adjustment, compared to the Latin American countries (Little et al. 1993 , Corden 1996 , Reisen 2000 . The explanation seems to lie in wellknown wage-price rigidities, in particular wage indexation, in the latter countries which serve to quickly dissipate the impact of nominal exchange rate depreciation (Little et al. 1993 , Chapter 7).
CONCLUSION
In the 1990s, the major capital-importing countries in Asia have managed to cope far better with the real exchange problem associated with capital flows compared to their Latin American counterparts. The degree of real exchange rate appreciation associated with capital inflows was uniformly much lower in the Asian countries, despite the fact that some of these countries experienced far greater foreign capital inflows relative to the size of their economies. According to the results of our empirical analysis the explanation of these differences seems to lie in both country specific factors (as reflected in differences in the coefficients in the real exchange rate function) and policy differences (as reflected in the levels of the relevant explanatory variables).
Our econometric results suggest that the composition of capital flows matters in determining their impact on the real exchange rate. 'The real exchange rate problem' is a phenomenon predominantly associated with 'other' capital flows (OCFW) and FDI seems to have a salutary effect on the real exchange rate. Moreover, due perhaps to the legacy of a traumatic macroeconomic policy history, a given level of OCFW brings about a far greater degree of appreciation of the real exchange in Latin America compared to Asia. This difference in the magnitude of the observed relationship, coupled with the greater importance of OCFW in total capital flows to Latin American countries, seem to go a long way in expanding the relatively higher degree of real exchange rate appreciation experienced by these countries compared to their Asian counterparts.
Among the policy variables considered, fiscal contraction seems to have been used more effectively by the Asian countries to cushion the real exchange rate against the appreciation pressure of capital inflows. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that sterilized intervention can generate a lasting impact on the real exchange rate. Finally, nominal exchange rate change seems to have a significant lasting effect on the real exchange rate only in Asian countries. Due perhaps to wage-price rigidities, the impact of a given nominal exchange rate change seems to dissipate quickly in Latin American countries.
APPENDIX MEASUREMENT OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
The real exchange rate (RER) is the price of traded goods relative to the price of nontraded (domestic) goods. In the absence of readily available indices of tradable and nontradable prices, the real exchange rate has to be proxied by available domestic and world price indices and nominal exchange rates. There is no unique way of constructing a proxy measure, but all commonly used measures compute the ratio,
where N ER denotes the nominal exchange rate (measured as domestic currency per foreign currency), PW is an index of foreign prices and PD is an index of domestic prices.
N ER and PW are weighted averages computed across trading partner countries. The country weights may be based on export shares, import shares or, most commonly, shares based on the sum of exports and imports, although the latter has no apparent theoretical foundation.
The particular measure used differs according to the measures used for PW and PD. Our preferred proxy measure makes use of foreign producer (wholesale) prices for PW and domestic GDP deflator for PD.. Country weights based on export shares are used in the construction of NER and P W series.
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By construction, the producer price index is dominated by the prices of tradables much more than the GDP deflator. The index may thus serve as a rough proxy for the theoretical concept of the real exchange rate -the relative prices of tradable to non-tradable goods. A convenient alternative to GDP deflator as the domestic price measure in constructing the index is the consumer price index (CPI) (Edwards 1989, Athukorala and Warr 2002) . Our preferred choice is the former, for two reasons. Firstly, GDP deflator provides a much broader, economy-wide coverage of price changes compared to CPI. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in most countries CPI, being a 'politically visible' economic indicator, is susceptible to manipulation.
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Most of the previous studies have typically used either of two other indicators, although the theoretical reasoning behind the particular measurement choice is seldom made explicit. One, which is perhaps the most widely used, particularly in publications of the IMF and the World Bank, uses a trade-weighted index of consumer prices in trading partner countries for P W and an index of consumer prices in the given country for
The use of this indicator as a proxy for the theoretical concept of a real exchange rate for developing countries is usually justified on the premise that under the low inflation conditions that prevail in developed countries (which are generally the major trading partners), producer prices and consumer prices tend to move together (Edwards 1989 ). The other is the J.P. Morgan index, which uses wholesale non-food manufacturing prices for both world and domestic prices. This measure may thus be viewed as an indicator of the international competitiveness of manufacturing goods produced in the given country. It is not a measure of internal competitiveness (the relative profitability of domestic production of tradables compared with non-traded goods and services), the concept of real exchange rate, which is theoretically more appropriate for the present analysis. Wholesale prices of traded goods generally adjust to exchange rate changes and the dismantling of trade barriers and are thus likely to deviate from the price trends of non-traded goods. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Latin America
Asia
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